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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
thus consistent with frequent statements that a revocation proceed-
ing is not part of the criminal process.",0
RUSSELL C. BRANNEN, JR.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
The cases decided on the subject of domestic relations in the
August, 1973 Term of the Wisconsin Supreme Court fall generally
into the areas of the adoption and custody of children, and prop-
erty division and settlement agreements.
I. THE ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
The Adoption of Tachick' was the most significant decision
dealing with the adoption and custody of children, because it was
the first Wisconsin case to define "the best interests of the child." 2
In this case petitioners sought to adopt an illegitimate grandson
who had been born to their son and a fifteen year old girl who had
been living in their home. A number of months after giving birth,
the mother of the child returned to her own family, leaving the
child with the petitioners. Approximately two years after the
child's birth, the county department of social services held a hear-
ing, at which the rights of both parents were terminated. The child
ex rel. Hanson v. H & SS Dept., 64 Wis. 2d 367, 379, 219 N.W.2d 267, 274 (1974). Wis.
Laws 1973, ch. 217 creates § 261.01(9m) and changes § 253.11 (l) to provide concurrent
jurisdiction.
100. State ex rel. Hanson v. H & SS Dept., 64 Wis. 2d at 379, 219 N.W.2d at 274;
State ex rel. R.R. v. Schmidt, 63 Wis. 2d at 90, 216 N.W.2d at 21.
I. 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973).
2. Id. at 543, 210 N.W.2d at 867. In State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services,
59 Wis. 2d 1,9, 207 N.W.2d 826, 831 (1973), the court stated:
The phrase, "best interests of the child," means all things to all people: it means
one thing to a juvenile judge, another thing to adoptive parents, something else to
natural parents, and still something different to disinterested observers. If judges
were endowed with omniscience, the problem would not be difficult; but the tendency
in man is to apply intuition in deciding that a child would be "better" with one set
of parents than with another, and 'then to express this intuitive feeling in terms of
the legal standard of being "in the best interests of the child." Courts have not laid
down any definite guidelines which can be followed in every case to insure protection
of what the average person means by "best interests." ... The "best-interests-of-
the-child" test does not speak in terms of the present, the immediate future, or even
the ultimate future of the child.
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remained in the grandparents' home pending the outcome of their
petition to adopt the child; the mother supported the grandparents'
petition. Largely due to objections by the state and county depart-
ments of health and social services, as well as by the guardian ad
litem, the trial court found adoption by the grandparents not to be
in the best interests of the child and denied the grandparents' peti-
tion.
On appeal the court considered, as a question of law 3 whether
the proposed adoption by the grandparents would indeed be in the
best interests of the child. First, the court discussed the history and
effect of a recommendation by a guardian ad litem in adoption
proceedings,4 and noted:
• . . [A] progressive retraction of authority from the guardian in
adoption proceedings and under the present law a trial court may
determine the best interests of the child as an original proposition
in an adoption proceeding; and where the adoption is not recom-
mended by the guardian of the child, the presumption of the
recommendation may be overcome by a fair preponderance of
credible evidence.5 (Emphasis added)
The court examined the factors considered in the trial court
denial of the grandparents' petition for adoption, and established
as the test of the best interests of the child in this fact situation:
• . . [T]he sole issue is whether grandparents can provide food,
shelter, clothing, love and affection, education and training
which will aid the child to develop to his full potential as a human
being.'
The trial court deemed several factors to be controlling. The
grandparents would be unable to protect the child from interfer-
ence by the natural parents, and the child's father would legally
become his brother. Also, the grandparents were unsuitable be-
cause of their age, their health, and the educational7 and discipli-
nary history of their own eight children. It was further argued on
appeal that psychological damage could result to the child from the
3. 60 Wis. 2d at 548, 210 N.W.2d at 869; contrary language in Adoption of Jackson,
201 Wis. 642, 231 N.W. 158 (1930), which deemed this to be a question of fact was
withdrawn.
4. 60 Wis. 2d at 544-546, 210 N.W.2d at 867-868.
5. Id. at 546, 210 N.W.2d at 868; Wis. STAT. § 48.85(2) (1971).
6. Id. at 548, 210 N.W.2d at 869.
7. Id. at 550, 210 N.W.2d at 870. The court said that the best interents of the child today
require at least a high school education or its equivalent.
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"bastard stigma," rejection by his natural parents, and possible
future "death trauma."
However, the court found these factors unpersuasive and re-
versed the trial court. In granting the grandparents' petition for
adoption, the court noted that no one factor is determinative of the
best interests of the child, but each must be weighted in light of
the facts.8 The court emphasized, however:9
(1) the petitioners were the grandparents of the child, with
natural love and affection for him;
(2) the petitioners have taken care of the child since birth, and
there would be "separation trauma" if the child were taken from
these "psychological parents;"
(3) the wishes of the child's mother in support of the grand-
parents' petition.
Therefore, the general test of the best interests of the child may
be expanded to require a determination of whether the petitioners
for adoption:
• . . [C]an provide food, shelter, clothing, love and affection,
education and training which will aid the child to develop to his
full potential as a human being."0
The practical assistance which this new definition provides is un-
certain, due to the very general nature of the factors to be consid-
ered.
Pfeifer v. Pfeifer" discussed other factors to be considered in
determining whether a custody award is in the best interests of the
child. In the Pfeifer case, the plaintiff/wife brought an action for
divorce. The defendant/husband in his answer sought custody of
the parties' five children. Although the court ordered temporary
custody to the mother, at trial the custody of the children was
awarded to the father. Plaintiff appealed the custody portion of the
judgment of absolute divorce.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court deci-
sion, finding no abuse of discretion in granting custody to the
father. In reaching its decision, the trial court considered evidence
concerning the plaintiffs adulterous relationship with an eighteen
year old boyfriend, and her emotional instability. The trial court
refused to make the mother's temporary award of custody of the
8. Id. at 549, 210 N.W.2d at 870.
9. Id. at 555-556, 210 N.W.2d at 873.
10. Id. at 548, 210 N.W.2d at 869.
11. 62 Wis. 2d 417, 215 N.W.2d 419 (1974).
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children more than one factor to be considered,12 and expressed its
belief that the transfer of custody to the father would cause the
children no "emotional or psychological disturbances."'13 The su-
preme court held that these factors justified the conclusion that
granting custory to the mother would not be in the best interests
of the children. The trial court's failure to order a social service
investigation (which is not mandatory)14 and to appoint a guardian
ad litem 5 was not reversible error.
The question in Kurz v. Kurz6 arose out of a post-trial motion
for modification of the custody award. Here the trial court, in
granting a divorce judgment, found both parents unfit to have
custody of their child. Custody was awarded to the paternal grand-
parents as being in the best interests of the child. At the time of
the divorce decree the mother was found unfit to have custody (due
to acts of adultery, evidence of a suicidal tendency, and the need
for psychiatric treatment). However, approximately one year later
she sought a change of custody due to her improved condition. On
appeal, the denial of the mother's motion by the trial court was
upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The court found that
custody of a child was not to be given to a parent "as a reward
for good conduct,' '1 7 but required:
(1) a showing that the divorced parent is a fit and proper
person to have custody and able to adequately care for the child;
and (2) a showing that the best interests of the child would be
served by the proposed change or modification of the custody
award."i
Since the mother failed to meet this burden of proof, the order
denying transfer of custody to the mother was properly affirmed.
12. Id. at 426, 215 N.W.2d at 424. Due to the lack of full inquiry by a court in awarding
temporary custody, such an order should not be deemed determinative.
13. Id. at 427, 215 N.W.2d at 424.
14. Id. at 427-428, 215 N.W.2d at 424.
15. Id. 430-431, 215 N.W.2d at 426. It should be noted that three members of the court
would have found an abuse of discretion in the failure of the trial court to appoint a guardian
ad litem when it became clear during the trial that there would be a dispute as to custody
of the children.
16. 62 Wis. 2d 677, 215 N.W.2d 555 (1974).
17. Id. at 683, 215 N.W.2d at 558, citing Dees v. Dees, 41 Wis. 2d 435, 164 N.W.2d
282 (1969); see also Wis. STAT. § 247.24(2) (1971).
18. 62 Wis. 2d at 686-687, 215 N.W.2d at 560. The burden of proof which applies in
awarding custody in divorce cases differs from that used where a surviving parent seeks
custody after a spouse has died under the rule in Ponsford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202
N.W.2d 5 (1972).
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II. PROPERTY DIVISION AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Several cases in the term dealt with property division and set-
tlement agreements in divorce proceedings. In Lacey v. Lacey9 the
plaintiff/wife obtained an absolute judgment of divorce in 1969,
and was granted custody of the parties' one child with child support
set at $60 per month. In lieu of alimony, the trial court made a
division of the property of the parties in an amended judgment, 0
from which the defendant/husband appeals. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court first determined the value of real property owned by
the wife before marriage, and deemed this to be her separate estate.
Next, the court discussed the effect of capital contributions from
"pooled funds." A division of the marital estate was calculated. 2'
However, such calculations are no longer required, due to the
amendment of the statute controlling alimony and property divi-
sion, Wisconsin Statute section 247.26.22
Finally, the court considered the division of property by the
trial court and agreed that 50 per cent to each party was a fair and
reasonable division of the marital estate. The equal division was
not an abuse of discretion, especially since the division was in lieu
of alimony. 3 While the court expressed concern that the trial
court failed to set forth the factors upon which it made its determi-
nation, as was requested in the remand in the first Lacey decision,24
the court did not remand for further proceedings due to the desire
of the parties for a final determination. The judgment as modified
was affirmed by the court.
In Vier v. Vier,25 the plaintiff/wife was granted an absolute
divorce on the grounds of desertion, and the trial court granted a
property settlement in lieu of alimony. The award granted defen-
dant $10,000. On appeal, the plaintiff questioned whether the trial
court abused its discretion in not expressly setting forth in its
19. 61 Wis. 2d 604, 213 N.W.2d 80 (1973).
20. The trial court judgment was amended after reversal and remand in a previous
decision, Lacey v. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N.W.2d 142 (1970). This case was important
because it discussed the factors involved in a proper division of the marital estate. This case
also directed trial courts to indicate the factors considered and the property values deter-
mined in making a property division.
21. WIs. STAT. § 247.26 (1969).
22. WIS. STAT. § 247.26 (1971).
23. The factors affecting property division in divorce cases which the court felt were
relevant and which were discussed in the decision in Lacey v. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d 378, 383,
173 N.W.2d 142, 145, were incorporated in Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1971).
24. Id. at 387, 173 N.W.2d at 147.
25. 62 Wis. 2d 636, 215 N.W.2d 432 (1974).
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opinion the factors considered by the court in its property award.
The court pointed out that while it had admonished trial courts to
indicate the reasons for its property divisions,26 the court would not
reverse, if from the record the court can reasonably conclude that
the division of property was equitable. Here the court found the
award reasonable because of the defendant's contribution to the
parties' resort business. However, the court stated:
We again urge trial courts to state their reasons why certain
assets are apportioned to one party and other assets are appor-
tioned to the other party. While the general result might well be
reasonable and equitable, giving one's reasons for reaching such
a result will cut down reversals for what might look to this court
like an abuse of discretion. This court should not be required to
search the record for reasons to sustain a trial court. The giving
of reasons by the trial court will also cut down cases where it is
necessary to set aside a judgment and send the case back for
further proceedings because it is impossible for this court to
review the trial court's decision. This court is too busy to attempt
in every case to justify the trial court's judgment with its own
reasons, as it has done in this appealY
The court gave further consideration to trial court awards in
division of a marital estate in the Rosenheimer 2 case. Upon grant-
ing an absolute divorce the trial court in Rosenheimer awarded the
plaintiff/wife $50,000, representing 22% of the marital estate. In
addition the trial court established a trust for the one child born
to the parties and ordered child support payments of $325 per
month. The defendant/husband appealed from this judgment.
The supreme court found that the $50,000 award to the plaintiff
was reasonable in light of the defendant's real estate and business
assets. The court looked to the factors discussed in Wisconsin
Statute section 247.26 in dividing the estate, giving:
. . . [D]ue regard to the legal and equitable rights of each party,
the length of the marriage, the age and health of the parties, the
liability of either party for debts or support of children, their
respective abilities and estates, whether the property award is in
lieu of or in addition to alimony, the character and situation of
the parties and all the circumstances of the case .... 21
26. 45 Wis. 2d at 387, 173 N.W.2d at 147; Husting v. Husting, 54 Wis. 2d 87, 91, 194
N.W.2d 801, 803 (1972).
27. 62 Wis. 2d at 642, 215 N.W.2d at 435.
28. Rosenheimer v. Rosenheimer, 63 Wis. 2d 1, 216 N.W.2d 25 (1974).
29. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1971).
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While the court found the amount of the award to be appropriate,
it found the requirement that payment be made within 45 days
unreasonable. This was because the husband would have been re-
quired to sell or encumber his home or business, both of which
were required to support the children from an earlier marriage.
The court suggested an alternate method of payment."
After considering statutes3 1 which permit the establishment of
trusts for education and support, the court struck from the judg-
ment of the trial court the trust set up for the parties' one child.
This was due to the lack of evidence that the father would not
provide for the education of the child on the same basis as that
provided to his children from another marriage. The court also
objected to the trust's improper provision for benefits subsequent
to the child reaching majority. The court revised the support pay-
ments ordered by the trial court to $250 per month, contending that
$325 'per month was excessive in light of the mother's earning
capacity and other factors.
In Tesch v. Tesch,31 the defendant/husband, upon his counter-
claim, was granted a divorce pursuant to a jury finding of adultery
on the part of the plaintiff/wife. While no alimony could be
awarded,3 3 the trial court awarded the wife approximately 38.3
per cent of the net marital estate. The defendant on appeal ques-
tioned this property distribution.
The court emphasized the Lacey 4 case in finding no abuse of
discretion in the award of property to the wife. After determining
the net estate, the trial court relied on the "rule" that one-third was
an appropriate award to a wife, in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances. The court stressed the rejection of any such formula
under the Lacey" decision. However, the trial court did list the
factors which it felt made the property division equitable. Although
the trial court had not considered all the factors listed in Lacey,3
the court did not feel "the missing factors mentioned by the defen-
dant would necessitate a shift in the division of the estate. '37 The
30. 63 Wis. 2d at 11, 216 N.W.2d at 29.
31. WIs. STAT. § 247.30 (1971); Wis. STAT. § 247.31 (1971).
32. 63 Wis. 2d 320, 217 N.W.2d 647 (1974).
33. WIs. STAT. § 247.26 (1971), which provides in part: ... no alimony shall be
granted to a party guilty of adultery not condoned.
34. 45 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N.W.2d 142 (1970).
35. Id. at 380-383, 173 N.W.2d at 144-145.
36. Id. at 383-384, 173 N.W.2d at 145.
37. 63 Wis. 2d at 329, 217 N.W.2d at 651.
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court noted that it "understood the feelings" of the husband about
the property division in light of his wife's adulterous conduct, but
it did not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in so
dividing their marital estate.38
The court also considered the determination of attorney's fees
for the wife and contribution to them by the husband. While there
is no required method for determining the amount of attorney fees,
the court said:
We deem it the better practice to have each attorney present
evidence on his fees at the time testimony is taken on the value
of assets and the amount of liabilities affecting the marital estate,
or if a bill is submitted to the court, that a copy be submitted to
opposing counsel so that comments may be made thereon."
This procedure provides a hearing and therefore meets the re-
quirements of due process of the law as to the amount of attorney
fees. The contribution of the husband to these fees is based on the
need of the wife and the husband's ability to pay.4" Once again, no
abuse of discretion was found in requiring the defendant/husband
to contribute $2,000 of a $2,500 bill to the plaintiff's attorney fees.
However, because both parents are concerned with protecting the
interests of the children in a divorce, the court did require the
plaintiff to pay 50 per cent of the guardian ad litem fee.
Finally, a brief discussion of the decision in Slawek v. Stroh4"
is warranted, because the case dealt with the rights of putative
fathers to assert their parenthood. It also discussed the public
policy considerations involved in a cause of action for "wrongful
birth."
In the Slawek case, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
to establish his parentage of an illegitimate child, and to define his
rights and duties with respect to custody, care, visitation and sup-
port of the child. The mother asserted affirmative defenses and
counterclaimed on the basis of fraud (which resulted in allegations
of assault and battery, breach of promise, and seduction), and
invasion of privacy. The child by a guardian ad litem counter-
claimed on a theory of "wrongful birth," seeking damages for the
38. Id. at 332, 217 N.W.2d at 653.
39. Id. at 334, 217 N.W.2d at 654.
40. Hirth v. Hirth, 48 Wis. 2d 491, 493-496, 180 N.W.2d 601, 602-604 (1970).
41. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974). For a more complete discussion of the issues
in this case, see 58 MARQ. L. REV. 175 (1974), "The Constitutional Rights of a Putative
Father to Establish his Parentage and Assert Parental Rights."
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publicizing of her illegitimate status. After resolving numerous
procedural questions, the court ruled that:
(1) A putative father has the constitutional right 2 to establish
his status as the parent of an illegitimate child, and therefore has
some parental rights and duties which may be determined by
means of a declaratory judgment.13
(2) While the mother has no cause of action for breach of
promise to marry in Wisconsin," she does have a cause of action
for seduction. 5
(3) While generally Wisconsin does not recognize a cause of
action for invasion of privacy, the exception for an intentional
causing of emotional distress permits the cause of action as pleaded
in this case.4
(4) Due to public policy and possible social ramifications, an
illegitimate child has no cause of action against her natural father
for "wrongful birth."47
The complex substantive and procedural questions involved in
this case were remanded for further proceedings.
JOHN W. KNUTESON
REAL PROPERTY
I. LANDLORD AND TENANT
In the 1973 term the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided two
cases involving the law of landlord and tenant, concerning the
landlord's right to receive rent. In State ex rel. Building Owners
& Managers Association of Milwaukee, Inc. v. Adamany,1 a group
of property owner-landlords brought an original action in the su-
preme court seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitution-
42. The court relied upon two recent cases, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
43. WIs. STAT. § 269.56 (1971); 62 Wis. 2d at 305-307, 215 N.W.2d at 15-16.
44. WIs. STAT. § 248.01 and § 248.02 (1971).
45. 62 Wis. 2d at 310-312, 215 N.W.2d at 18-19; 43 MARQ. L. REV. 341, 356 (1960).
46. Id. at 315, 215 N.W.2d at 20, citing Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d
312 (1963).
47. 62 Wis. 2d at 316-318, 215 N.W.2d at 21-22.
I. 64 Wis. 2d 280, 219 N.W.2d 274 (1974).
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